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THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM:
A PRIMER FOR INVESTORS
Jerome A. Cohen & John E. Lange*
I. INTRODUCTON
This chapter presents a general introduction to aspects of the Chinese
legal system of particular interest to investors in securities of Chinese
enterprises or companies organized to invest in China. Our principal focus
is on the creation of legally binding obligations under Chinese law, and the
enforcement of those obligations. We do not address the legal and
practical issues involved in structuring and negotiating a deal in China.
Rather, we will try to help answer a question that has come increasingly
to the forefront in the business and investment community: once you have
a deal in China, what have you got?
To approach this question, a flat recitation of Chinese law will not do.
Legal development in China is being driven-or, in many cases, pulled at
some distance behind-by the extraordinarily fundamental and
comprehensive reform process begun in China in 1979 and the ferocious
commercial energy that process has unleashed. Practice is well ahead of
law in some areas and well behind it in others, and both law and practice
are constantly evolving. The best way to understand Chinese law is to
examine it within the framework of a few basic themes relating to the
historical and cultural context in which the law operates and to the current
reform process in particular. These themes, far from being abstract and
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academic, are often an essential means of making sense of what goes on
day to day in the commercial and financial arena. We will begin by
introducing these basic themes, and then proceed to an overview of
contract law; the law relating to property rights; securities law; certain
features of the company law and joint venture law; and the enforcement of
legal obligations and laws protecting creditors (such as bankruptcy law and
the law relating to mortgages and security interests). Finally, we will
briefly discuss the legal system of Hong Kong and how it may change
after the transition to Chinese control in 1997.
U. CENTRAL THEMES
A. The Development of the Legal System
The state has historically played-and continues to play-a pervasive
role in economic activity in China. In the Communist era, the state has
been the dominant economic actor. As a consequence, the development of
law as a system of norms governing economic activity involving private
parties was stunted for many years.
The Chinese legal system today is a classic example of a glass that is
half empty or half full, depending upon how you look at it. Law has been
a crucial underpinning for the PRC's stunning economic progress of the
past 18 years. Indeed, China is undoubtedly the contemporary world's
leading example of a national elite's conscious application of law as a
stimulus to development. When Deng Xiaoping assumed the leadership in
1978 and put an end to the policy of "class struggle" that had led to the
Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, he and his colleagues in the Party
Politburo and Central Committee made it clear that the construction of a
legal system would be an indispensable element of the newly-proclaimed
modernization policy. At that time, the PRC displayed virtually none of
the indicia of a formal legal system. It had almost nothing in the way of
useful economic legislation. Its Soviet-style legal institutions from the
1950s were a shambles. Its judges, prosecutors, lawyers, legislative
draftsmen and ministry legal experts had been on the shelf for at least 20
years, and legal education and scholarship were barely starting to revive.
Eighteen years later, we are able to look back on a remarkable burst
of legislative activity. There are now in place at the national level-to
name only some of the basic building blocks-a mini-code entitled General
Principles of Civil Law, detailed domestic and foreign-related contract
laws, edicts pertaining to the licensing of technology, a fairly
comprehensive collection of laws and regulations for authorizing and
attracting the various forms of foreign direct investment, a number of
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regulations relating to loans, guaranties, foreign exchange controls and
other financial matters, a company law, central and commercial banking
legislation, detailed regulations for the securities industry, a negotiable
instruments law, a law on security interests, a trial bankruptcy law, a series
of laws concerning income taxation of enterprises and individuals as well
as other taxes, several laws on labor protection and trade unions, elaborate
laws for the protection of intellectual property rights and for the prohibition
of unfair competition, a real estate law, a considerable body of
environmental and consumer protection legislation, a civil procedure code,
an administrative litigation law and rules for the conciliation and arbitration
of domestic and international business disputes. Much more national
economic legislation, including more sophisticated laws regulating
securities and partnerships, is scheduled to be adopted in the near future,
a good deal of it based upon impressive local regulations already in place
in the country's leading commercial centers.
International legislation has also been a major part of this effort. The
PRC now adheres to most of the principal multilateral treaties for economic
cooperation, such as the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property Rights, various copyright and patent conventions, the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards and the Hague Convention on service abroad of
documents in civil and commercial matters. China has, in addition, erected
an impressive network of bilateral agreements to promote trade and
investment with many countries, including numerous tax treaties, mutual
protection of investment agreements and judicial assistance agreements.
And yet Western investors in China complain incessantly about the
lack of transparency, clarity and consistency in Chinese law; about rigid
bureaucratization and the lack of clear criteria or accountability for
bureaucratic actions; and about the lack of a competent and independent
judiciary to enforce the law. These complaints are often fair, and evidence
very serious problems for foreign businessmen and investors. Indeed, they
are frequently shared by Chinese parties as well. Clearly, the Chinese legal
system has a long way to go before it provides anything close to a
functional equivalent of the mature legal systems found in the major
Western nations.
The reform process begun in 1978 is still a very recent phenomenon
in historical terms, and the Chinese legal system is very much a work in
progress. Observers viewing it from the outside, or encountering it directly
(often to their great frustration), do well to maintain that historical
perspective. It is relatively easy to adopt legislative frameworks and
regulatory regimes-often imported from abroad-to govern broad fields
1997]
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of activity. It is much more difficult and time consuming to put those laws
into practice, to adapt them to local conditions, to fill in the gaps and to
develop a body of interpretation and precedent that can make the rules
meaningful in specific cases. Most difficult and time consuming of all-as
evidenced by the continued weakness of the Chinese judiciary-is the task
of building institutions that can effectively, consistently and fairly enforce
those laws across a country as vast as China. The system of modem
commercial law in China cannot be understood without appreciating how
young it is; 18 years is a very short period of time to develop the web of
rules, customs, practices, institutions, habits and attitudes that make up a
legal system.
B. The Role of the State
The ubiquitous presence of the state and the multiplicity of roles that it
plays-regulator, business operator, business owner, business partner,
sovereign borrower-is a frequent source of confusion for Westerners. The
reform process is not necessarily reducing the role of the state; indeed,
reform and openness have increased the frequency and diversity of
encounters between foreign businessmen and the Chinese state in its
various guises. Reform is, however, changing the role of the state in
important ways, with the essential thrust being toward greater devolution
of economic responsibility, greater autonomy for enterprises and greater
differentiation between the role of the state as sovereign and its role as an
economic actor. Fewer and fewer enterprises are entirely state-owned, and
an increasing number of those that are entirely state-owned are being
transformed into stock companies with limited liability and, in many cases,
share ownership distributed among a number of governmental entities and
state-owned enterprises. Consistent with the basic principles of the reform
program, the Chinese government is less likely than in the past to stand
behind the debts of a Chinese business enterprise simply because that
enterprise is owned, directly or indirectly, by the state. There is a certain
irony to the fact that China, in becoming more like capitalist states, is
becoming a more confusing place for Western businessmen.
C. The Dynamic of Refonn
Reform in China is not proceeding in accordance with a detailed master
plan. There is a great deal of experimentation involved. In any given field
there are frequent cycles of laissez faire-creating a sort of policy
laboratory in which the government can study the effects of unbridled
activity-followed by a tightening of regulation. Likewise,
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experimentation is frequently tolerated (or encouraged) at a local or
regional level, followed by a tightening of regulation at the central level.
There are frequent sharp turns and reversals as the government encounters
unexpected effects of new policies. The inevitable result of the way the
reform process works is a great deal of uncertainty. Therein lies a great
dilemma for foreign investors. Change means uncertainty, and uncertainty
can be an investor's enemy; but it would be a great lost opportunity if
China were to alter its commitment to rapid and radical change.
D. The Center vs. the Provinces
The reform process in China is taking place against the backdrop of a
vigorous struggle for authority among central, provincial and local levels
of government. The current struggle is simply the latest variation on one
of the most ancient and enduring themes of Chinese history, epitomized by
the familiar saying that "heaven is high and the emperor is far away." The
struggle has intensified as the reform process has advanced, stimulating
greater economic activity-which in China as elsewhere resists
regulation-throughout the country. The result of this for foreign investors
is further uncertainty and confusion concerning governmental policies,
applicable laws and regulations and required approvals. Often investors are
caught in the middle, between the more investor-friendly local authorities
and the more macro-oriented central authorities, each offering their
own-often sharply divergent-visions of the applicable regulatory
framework and the proper way to proceed. In addition, the vastness of
China and the existence of entrenched local power bases often makes it
difficult for the central government to enforce laws that it adopts for the
benefit of investors. This is in fact one of the principal points made by the
central government itself in the recent dispute with the U.S. over the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. The conflict between central
and local authorities will continue to handicap the development of the
Chinese legal system, and to heighten the risks for foreign investors, at
least until China evolves and enforces a reasonably clear and rational
allocation of authority between the central and provincial governments.
E. Corruption
The problem of corruption in China has received a great deal of
attention. An analysis of the sources and the extent of this problem is
beyond the scope of this chapter, but the effect of corruption on the
development of the legal system should be noted. Corruption of course
undermines the fair and impartial administration of law and erodes respect
1997]
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(or inhibits the development of respect) for the rule of law. The
importance in Chinese culture of guanxi-relationships-is itself a mild
form of corruption to the extent that it affects relations between the
government and private entities, in that it inevitably compromises the
principle of equal treatment under the law. The point where relationships
and "favors" turn into bribery and graft is not always clear, although
responsible investors certainly can-and the vast majority of investors
do-successfully conclude transactions without any need to skate close to
the line. But even where corruption is not in fact present, the widespread
suspicion of it is corrosive of legal relationships. One may hope that a
relaxation of state control over the economy will over time reduce the
opportunities and incentives for corruption, but clearly this problem will
continue to cloud business relationships and the development of the legal
system for a long time to come.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK
In structure and theory, China's legal system is a "civil law" system
based on written statutes. Unlike in the "common law" system of the U.S.
and the U.K., decided cases do not constitute binding precedents, but they
are sometimes referred to as guidance.
In form, under the Constitution of 1982, the highest governmental
authority in China is the legislature, the National People's Congress
("NPC"), which is composed of 3,000 deputies and only meets in plenary
session for one three-week sitting a year. Through its Standing Committee,
however, the NPC has become increasingly active in the legislative drafting
process and no longer plays a "rubber stamp" role for legislation proposed
by the Communist Party or the State Council.
The State Council is the executive arm of the government and has the
power to enact and administer rules and regulations. In theory, since
China has a unified, hierarchical government rather than one based on a
separation of powers, the State Council is subordinate to the NPC. It
currently has 31 ministries, nine commissions (including the State Planning
Commission, the State Economic and Trade Commission and the State
Commission on Restructuring the Economic System) and many
administrative agencies under its jurisdiction. The Premier has overall
responsibility for the State Council and the performance of the executive
functions of the government.
China is divided for administrative purposes into 22 provinces, five
autonomous regions and three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai and
Tianjin) under the direct control of the central government. China does not
have a federal system, in that there are no spheres of authority
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constitutionally reserved for the provincial governments; they are, at least
in theory, merely administrative arms of the central government.
Provincial and local governments may adopt rules and regulations, so long
as they are not inconsistent with central government laws, rules and
regulations. As indicated above, however, the practice is often not as
simple as the theory.
The court system in the PRC has four levels: the Elementary People's
Court, the Intermediate People's Court, the High People's Court and the
Supreme People's Court. The courts contain specialized divisions for
different types of cases, usually including civil, economic, administrative
and foreign-related business divisions. An increasing number of courts are
establishing intellectual property divisions and there are also several
specialized courts. The Supreme People's Court, the highest court in
China, is responsible to the NPC and supervises the adjudicative work of
all other courts, but has no power over their personnel or budgets.
Decisions in these matters are in the hands of local government, a system
that contributes greatly to what the Chinese have labeled "local judicial
protectionism." Although the judicial system has made important progress
in the past decade, it still suffers from great inefficiency and a severe
shortage of capable judges trained and experienced in commercial law.
More fundamentally, despite constitutional and legislative language that
confers the power to decide cases independently, the courts, like all other
governmental institutions, are subject to tight political control, which is
primarily manifested in criminal cases involving alleged
"counterrevolutionary" offenses as well as in cases involving local
economic interests in which the local government has a stake.
The Communist Party of China has been the governing political party
of China since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
The Communist Party plays a leading role (recognized in the Constitution)
at all levels of government, although its specific legislative, executive and
judicial functions are rarely spelled out in publicly available official
documents. Party policy in legal affairs is usually formulated and
coordinated by the Political-Legal Committee of the Party Central
Committee, whose leading members include the President of the Supreme
Court, the Procurator General, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of
Public Security and the Minister of State Security.
1997]
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IV. THE CREATION OF BINDING OBLIGATIONS
A. Contract Law Basics
Although the General Principles of Civil Law (the "Civil Code")
contains a number of basic contract principles, China actually has a
bifurcated system of contract law, with the Economic Contract Law of
1993 applying to contracts between entities with Chinese nationality and
the Foreign Economic Contract Law of 1985 (the "FECL") applying to
most contracts between foreign entities and Chinese economic entities.
The following discussion concentrates on the FECL, although it should be
noted that the contracts between Chinese entities and foreign-invested
enterprises ("FIEs") established in China are (because such FIEs have
Chinese nationality) governed by the Economic Contract Law.
Most of the principles of contract law reflected in the FECL are quite
similar to those embodied in the contract laws of Western jurisdictions.
Indeed, the concepts of offer and acceptance, intent, consideration and
other matters dealing with formation of contracts are not materially
different from North American models. The FECL and an "Explanation
of Several Questions Concerning Application of the Foreign Economic
Contract Law" issued by the Supreme People's Court in 1987 stipulate a
number of grounds which may render a contract void, including various
circumstances relating to capacity, authority and legality (discussed further
below) and fraud or duress. In addition, contracts may be voidable upon
application of a party in the event of fundamental mistake or "manifest
unfairness," although the principle of severability reflected in the FECL
may permit the offending clause alone to be voided.
The principles of contract performance and liability for breach
included in the FECL are likewise similar to those prevalent in Western
legal systems. The FECL permits parties to agree on liquidated damages
for breach. There is provision for excusing performance on grounds of
force majeure, which has raised the issue of whether acts of the Chinese
government, such as changes in the state economic plan, can constitute
force majeure excusing performance by a Chinese enterprise. However,
contracting parties are permitted to (and frequently do) define and limit in
the contract the events that will be deemed to constitute force majeure.
Under the FECL, the parties are permitted to choose the law that will
govern the resolution of disputes arising under the contract, except that
joint venture contracts and contracts for exploration or development of
natural resources must be governed by Chinese law. If no governing law
is stipulated, the law of the country with the greatest contact with the
transaction (usually China) will apply. On matters for which Chinese law
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has made no provision, the FECL specifically permits the application of
international practice.
Consistent with the Chinese preference for the settlement of disputes
through friendly means, the FECL states that "when contractual disputes
arise, the parties should do everything possible to resolve them through
consultation or third party mediation". However, the parties may agree in
the contract to submit disputes to a Chinese or foreign arbitral body. If
there is no arbitration agreement, either party may bring suit in the Chinese
courts. Although the FECL does not authorize reference of disputes to
foreign courts, international financial contracts with Chinese entities often
provide for the non-exclusive jurisdiction of foreign courts. In practice,
most contracts between Chinese and foreign entities provide for arbitration,
and Chinese entities are frequently prepared to agree to arbitration outside
of China (see section 8 below).
The FECL includes a vague but helpful "grandfather" provision
purporting to insulate certain types of contracts from adverse changes in
Chinese law. Article 40 of the FECL states that, in the event of a change
in law, joint venture contracts and natural resource contracts that have
previously been approved by the state may continue to be implemented in
accordance with their original terms.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there is much in the
FECL-despite the fact that its provisions are very general and leave many
gaps-that should give comfort to foreign investors and businessmen. As
a practical matter, the greatest challenge facing foreign parties in assuring
themselves that they have concluded legally valid contracts with Chinese
enterprises flows from the strict limits that are placed on the permitted
activities of Chinese entities; frequent uncertainty regarding what
governmental approvals are required in connection with a given transaction;
and the resulting inability of the foreign party in many cases to be sure that
its contract is with a competent party, fully authorized and with all of the
official approvals required to make it valid and binding.
B. Capacity, Authority and Approvals
According to the FECL and the Explanation by the Supreme People's
Court, a contract will be void and unenforceable if, among other things,
* a party to the contract does not possess capacity to contract;
the Chinese party has not received authority to engage in
international trade;
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" the conclusion of the contract by the Chinese party exceeds its
permitted business scope;
" the contract is concluded by an agent in the name of a principal
and the agent does not have authority to act as agent, or has acted
in excess of its authority, and the principal does not subsequently
ratify the agent's act;
" the contract violates the law or public interest of the PRC;
" approval of the contract by governmental authorities is required
and has not been obtained; or
* the contract harms the interest of the state, the public or third
parties or is concluded with the duplicity of the parties or by
using illegitimate forms to conceal illegal objectives.
In dealings with Chinese enterprises, issues of legal capacity, authority
and governmental approvals take on a prominence they ordinarily do not
have, and present pitfalls they ordinarily do not present, in transactions
among Western enterprises. The reasons for this relate to some of the
factors identified above as central themes of China's legal development.
Economic activity has historically been under tight state control, involving
strict limits on the types of enterprises permitted to engage in a given type
of activity and the governmental approvals required for any given
transaction. The reform process has liberated an enormous amount of pent-
up economic energy, encouraging enterprises with an entrepreneurial
attitude to push the envelope of permitted activity. For better or worse,
they are often one step ahead of the law. This may be an inevitable result
of the way the reform process works; experimentation is tolerated (often
without any official sanction) while new regulatory regimes are formulated.
This advances the ball on reform but frequently leaves investors in a very
frustrating position. They are offered opportunities for transactions that
they know are not strictly authorized by law, but they know that
"everybody's doing it"; they see governmental authorities with full
knowledge of such transactions doing nothing to stop them (or even
encouraging and participating in them) and believe, probably quite rightly,
that the law will continue to be ignored until it is ultimately changed to
catch up with practice; but they cannot be certain, they cannot get the type
of comfort from lawyers that they are accustomed to getting in other
jurisdictions, and they are left with a lingering fear that they might end up
as a target of the government's next campaign against foreign investment
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abuses. The guerrilla war between central and local authorities, and often
among different governmental agencies at the same level, adds a further
dimension to the problem, treating investors to the spectacle of two or
more sets of governmental officials offering entirely different
interpretations of what the law requires. Problems like these are at the root
of a pervasive sense of ambiguity and vague anxiety that often afflicts
investors in China.
This syndrome may be to some extent the unavoidable condition of the
China investor. But these risks can be identified, isolated and contained,
at a level that many investors over the years have found to be tolerable,
through a thorough understanding of the legal principles involved and
prudence and discipline in executing transactions. The following brief
summary of the law relating to legal capacity, authority and approvals
gives some indication of the areas in which risks can be managed, and the
areas in which the Chinese government must do more to create an
acceptable investment climate.
C. Legal Capacity
Chinese civil law provides for the existence of "legal persons", i.e.,
organizations that possess legal capacity for civil acts and that enjoy civil
rights and bear civil obligations independently in accordance with law.
There are different types of legal persons, although the most important is
the "enterprise legal person", a status designed for entities with an
economic focus. An enterprise legal person must be registered with the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce. State and collectively
owned enterprises, and most foreign-invested enterprises, are enterprise
legal persons. In certain circumstances government agencies may possess
the status of legal persons and enter into business contracts. Individuals
are not legal persons under Chinese law, although they may enter into
contracts governed by the Civil Code. Only legal persons and (pursuant
to the Civil Code) individuals may enter into binding contracts under
Chinese law.
As the discussion above indicates, the issue of legal personality under
Chinese law is somewhat complex but extremely important in determining
whether a Chinese party may enter into a binding contract and, if so, what
legal regime it will be governed by. Accordingly, a foreign party entering
into business transactions in China must obtain appropriate evidence of the
legal person status of the Chinese party.
1997]
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1. Authority
The issue of authority can be broken down into two sub-issues: (i) is
the contract within the authorized scope of business of the Chinese
enterprise, and (ii) is the person executing the contract on behalf of the
Chinese party authorized to do so? Unlike most business enterprises in
Western jurisdictions, Chinese enterprises are subject to tight restrictions
on the scope of business activities in which they are authorized to engage.
These restrictions are one of the means employed by the state to regulate
economic activity. The permitted business scope of an enterprise is set
forth in its business license. The FECL requires not only that the contract
in question be within the authorized scope of the enterprise's business, but
also that a contracting enterprise be specifically authorized to enter into
contracts with foreign parties. These matters can usually be verified to the
reasonable satisfaction of a prudent foreign party, although sometimes
(particularly with certain types of governmental organizations) the situation
is not entirely clear.
Although each legal person has a single authorized "legal
representative," contracts executed by other responsible employees pursuant
to their duties in the ordinary course of business are normally valid and
binding upon the Chinese party. However, there is not a well-developed
concept in Chinese law analogous to the common law doctrine of "apparent
authority" (pursuant to which an entity may be bound by acts of a person
whom it permits or suffers to hold himself out as an authorized
representative of that entity), although the FECL does provide that, if a
principal is aware of a contract entered into by an agent and fails promptly
to issue a disclaimer, the contract will be considered valid. At this early
stage in the development of PRC law, in order to minimize the likelihood
that the contract may be claimed or rendered void for lack of authorization
of the signer, it is desirable to require any signer, including the legal
representative, to produce a power of attorney evidencing his authorization.
In addition, in the case of an enterprise converted into a stock company
governed by the recently enacted Company Law, approval of the board of
directors of the enterprise may be required.
2. Approvals
The task of obtaining all necessary governmental approvals is usually
the greatest challenge in concluding any transaction in China. The number
and variety of governmental approvals required for any given transaction
can be quite astonishing to business people accustomed to the less
regulated business environment of the West. As noted above, the failure
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to obtain a necessary governmental approval may render a contract void
and unenforceable. Unfortunately, it is sometimes difficult even to
determine what approvals are required. The situation with respect to
approvals is rendered particularly chaotic by struggles for power among
governmental authorities, particularly the struggle between central and local
authorities referred to above. Widespread confusion and brazen flouting
of central government regulations by local authorities often put investors
in an extremely awkward position. There is without a doubt a pressing
need for China to introduce greater transparency and certainty with respect
to approvals that are required for business transactions and the criteria that
will be applied in granting them.
D. Who is Responsible?
Under Chinese law, the legal person entering into a contract is responsible
for the obligations under that contract. With few exceptions, entities that
are not parties to the contract have no liabilities under it. This means that,
in the case of a contract entered into by a subsidiary company, the liability
does not extend to the parent company in the absence of an explicit written
guarantee. Likewise, in the case of a contract entered into by a state-
owned enterprise, the liability does not extend to the enterprise's
"department in charge" or any other governmental entity. Foreigners
making contracts with any Chinese entity must assume-just as is the case
in the U.S. and other Western jurisdictions-that only the specific legal
entity executing a contract will be liable under that contract, unless a
written guarantee (which must be enforceable as a contract in its own right)
is provided by some other party. The reform process, in progressively
liberating Chinese enterprises from the control-and weaning them from
the support-of governmental organs, has probably increased the likelihood
of unremedied defaults in contracts between Chinese and foreign
enterprises.
With respect to foreign borrowings, the practice that evolved in China
during the 1980s and early 1990s was to limit broad authority to borrow
to ten overseas borrowing "windows", including the Bank of China, the
Bank of Communications, the China International Trust and Investment
Company ("CITIC"), the China Investment Bank, and the "ITICs" of
Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan, Shanghai, Tianjin and Dalian. Borrowings in
foreign currency by any other Chinese entity were typically guaranteed by
one of the "windows", most commonly the Bank of China. There was an
implicit assumption among lenders-never tested-that the Chinese
government would stand behind the debt and guarantees issued by the
"window" entities. In the past few years, the availability of guarantees
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from the Bank of China and the other "windows" has declined
dramatically. This is a prelude to introduction of a new debt management
system designed to favor borrowings by entities with a capacity to pay
without government support. In addition, the Chinese government has
made clear that only debt issued directly by the central government-such
as the $1 billion bond issue through the Ministry of Finance completed in
February 1994-constitutes a legal obligation of the Chinese government
and that, consistent with the principles of reform, even debt of such
prominent "windows" as the Bank of China and CITIC should not be
considered as being backed by the full credit of the Chinese government.
As stated in the prospectus for the 1994 Ministry of Finance bond issue:
While the Central Government is responsible for the debt it issues,
with the exception of certain internal debt incurred by certain Central
Government-owned institutions, it has not guaranteed the payment of
any other debt. It has, in the past, taken steps to ensure that such
other debt is repaid. In many cases, however, the Central Government
is under no legal obligation to ensure repayment. For example, before
the reform of the banking system that began in July 1993, the Central
Government indirectly supported debt incurred by certain of the
specialized and commercial banks and its international trust and
investment corporations through such mechanisms as committing to
extend loans to repay debt incurred by those institutions. As the
financial system reforms are implemented, however, the relationship
of these institutions to the Central Government is expected to change
While internal Chinese regulations provide for various forms of
support by central government organs for debt issued by the "window"
entities, and none of the "windows" has ever defaulted on a foreign
borrowing, those internal regulations do not constitute an official guarantee
to lenders or bondholders.
The degree of responsibility of parent entities for borrowings and other
contractual obligations of their subsidiaries is frequently an issue in dealing
with Chinese enterprises. Like Western companies, Chinese enterprises
frequently conduct business transactions through subsidiaries. Mainland
Chinese parents may enter into transactions through Hong Kong or other
non-PRC subsidiaries, often to avoid approval requirements applicable to
the Mainland company. The parent may offer a letter of support or some
other non-binding comfort to the foreign party-again, frequently because
the parent may not be willing to ask for, or may not be able to get, the
necessary governmental approvals (such as SAEC approval for the
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guarantee of a foreign exchange borrowing) to enter into a binding
commitment. While the Chinese parent might voluntarily honor such a
"moral obligation" for business reasons, it is not a contract and would not
be enforceable under Chinese law.
In maintaining the distinction between parent and subsidiary, Chinese
law is not substantially different from U.S. law, except that there is as yet
no well-developed doctrine under Chinese law similar to the doctrine under
U.S. law permitting creditors to "pierce the corporate veil" in certain
circumstances where corporate formalities have not been observed and the
distinction between parent and subsidiary has not been observed by the
parent itself.
E. Some Observations on Contracts in China
Relative to Westerners, Chinese tend to view contracts somewhat more
in the context of the overall relationship between the parties and somewhat
less as discrete compacts complete within their four corners. The net effect
of this relationship orientation on respect for contractual obligations is
debatable; one might argue that it leads to an approach to the interpretation
and application of contracts that may be somewhat less faithful to the letter
of the contract, but perhaps more faithful to the spirit.
One thing that may certainly be said about the Chinese emphasis on
relationships, however, is that it often leads to a dangerous fallacy among
Westerners: the notion that the Chinese don't do business with long,
detailed contracts, but rather insist upon relying principally on the bond of
trust. Foreigners frequently submit too easily to platitudes about the
Chinese (or Asian) way of doing business, when in fact the need for a
detailed contract covering all material contingencies is usually even greater
when doing business in China than it would be elsewhere. The reason for
this is that, given the state of development of Chinese law, the contract
must not only set forth the business deal between the parties, but also
provide a broader legal framework for the deal, filling some of the gaps in
the legal system itself. In addition, sufficiently detailed contracts can allow
foreign parties to avoid some of the difficulties of enforcing contracts in
China. It is often possible, if the Chinese party has breached a contract
and friendly negotiations are unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, to
appeal for assistance from the Chinese enterprise's department in charge,
the municipal government or other higher authorities-and such appeals are
often successful, if the contract is clear and covers whatever contingency
has arisen. Chinese enterprises, contrary to the stereotype, are usually
willing to work with detailed contracts, and indeed in negotiations study
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the wording at least as carefully, and take it at least as seriously, as their
Western counterparts.
The foregoing discussion does not purport to answer a bottom-line
question of considerable interest to investors: are Chinese enterprises more
likely to renege on contracts than are their Western counterparts? This
essentially empirical question is at this point unanswerable in any scientific
fashion. Ad hoc impressions cannot substitute for data. One thing is clear,
however-the answer is unlikely to be simple and unequivocal. Moreover,
pre-occupation with the general issue can distract attention from practical
problems resulting from economic developments that adversely influence
Chinese contractual performance. One example is "triangular debt" and its
effect on the ability of essentially sound and well-intentioned enterprises
to honor their obligations. The experience of the past 18 years suggests
that, if a Chinese enterprise does not pay its debts, the reason is far less
likely to be some cultural predilection for, and legal indulgence toward,
reneging on obligations than the simple fact that the enterprise does not
have the money.
Before leaving this subject, some mention should be made of the
recent Lehman Brothers lawsuits that have received much media attention.
Lehman filed suits in U.S. federal court seeking to collect a total of more
than $124 million from four Chinese state-owned enterprises in connection
with various foreign exchange spot and futures contracts, foreign exchange
options and interest rate swaps. The Chinese enterprises claimed that the
individuals entering into the relevant contracts were not authorized to do
so (and in fact were inexperienced employees taken advantage of by
Lehman); that the transactions were outside of the permitted scope of
business of the enterprises; that the transactions required certain
governmental approvals that were not obtained; that Lehman knew or
should have known of these deficiencies; and that, in any event, Lehman
failed adequately to disclose the risks involved in the transactions. All of
the facts of these cases may not become clear for some time to come,
especially since Lehman has now settled three of its four suits on a
confidential basis, in each case on terms reportedly favorable to Lehman.
Whatever the details, a strong argument can be made that these cases are
best looked at not as archetypal examples of Chinese enterprises not paying
their debts, but rather as fairly typical examples of the type of litigation
arising in various parts of the world over the enormous losses sustained in
derivatives transactions in early 1994. In fact, the similarities between the
defenses espoused by the defendants in the Lehman Brothers suits and the
claims made by Orange County in its recent suit against Merrill Lynch-a
suit seeking avoidance of various derivatives transactions on the grounds
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that the transactions were not authorized activities of the municipality and
that Merrill Lynch did not adequately explain the risks-are quite striking.
Despite the amount of press they have gotten in the West, neither the
Lehman Brothers experience nor the McDonald's case (discussed briefly
below) is particularly representative of the real issues facing investors in
evaluating the worth of contractual rights in China. But there are real
issues, and they arise principally from the fact that the process of economic
and legal reform has proceeded faster in some fields than in others. State-
owned enterprises have been permitted to expand and multiply their
commercial relationships with foreigners-thereby greatly increasing the
probability of occasional defaults. When the defaults come, foreigners
naturally take the view that the Chinese government should stand behind
the obligations of these enterprises. The government takes the position that
these are commercial debts and not the government's responsibility-that
(as a top official of CITIC was quoted in the International Herald Tribune
as saying) "these foreign lenders have their own lawyers" and should know
better than to seek recourse from the government. On the face of it, the
government has the better end of the argument, and foreign parties must
get used to performing more sophisticated credit analysis of Chinese
enterprises. But the Chinese government cannot entirely absolve itself of
responsibility for the performance of state-owned enterprises unless and
until it has established a legal framework providing fully effective
enforcement mechanisms through which those enterprises can be held
accountable. As discussed further below, China is still a good distance
from that point. In the long run, it will be in the best interests of everyone
concerned for foreign investors and governments to focus on the issue of
improving creditors' ability to enforce valid claims against debtor
enterprises, rather than seeking continued government bail-outs that simply
help to perpetuate the immaturity of the Chinese legal and economic
systems.
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS
The law relating to private property rights is not very well
developed-which is understandable, given that China remains a
Communist state. All land in China is owned by either the state or
collectives, and it was only in 1988 that a constitutional amendment was
adopted clarifying the right of private entities to hold long-term land use
rights. This action cleared the way for the adoption, in 1990, of
regulations providing a reasonably comprehensive system for the granting
of long-term land use rights in exchange for the payment of a grant fee to
the state. Under this system, until a grant fee is paid and a land grant
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contract is entered into with the relevant land bureau, land is held in the
PRC only pursuant to "allocated" land use rights, which may be revoked
with minimal compensation. The current law generally requires state-
owned enterprises with allocated land use rights to convert them into
"granted" land use rights before contributing them to a joint venture with
a foreign enterprise or leasing them, although Chinese joint venture
partners frequently resist regularizing their land use rights in this manner
(quite simply because it would require them to make a substantial payment
to the government that they otherwise would not have to make). Granted
land use rights may be terminated prior to expiration only "under special
circumstances . . . in accordance with legal procedure if such early
termination is required in the public interest." Compensation must be paid
to the holder of the land use rights in an amount taking into account the
remaining term of the rights and the extent of the land development and
utilization. Although it is hard to predict how this will work out in
practice in any given case, the concepts are not substantially different from
those governing the practice of "eminent domain" condemnation in the
U.S. and other Western nations.
In addition to the real property law described above, China has
extensive laws governing the protection of intellectual property rights,
including rights under patents, trademarks and copyrights. The complaints
of foreign companies and governments in this area have been about
enforcement, not about the legal regime itself. Although the press
frequently reports glaring examples of PRC failure to enforce copyright
protections in the media and computer software fields, there are also many
cases (which have received far less attention) in which Chinese officials
have effectively cooperated in protecting patent and trademark rights of
foreign companies.
There are a number of other Chinese laws that provide protection for
private property, including provisions of the Chinese Constitution, the
General Principles of Civil Law, the State Compensation Law, the
Administrative Litigation Law, the Inheritance Law and the legislation
relating to FIEs. In addition, China is party to a number of treaties for the
mutual encouragement and protection of investment that provide for some
type of market value-based compensation in the event of an expropriation
of private property, although there is as yet no such treaty with the U.S.
VI. SECURITIES LAW
As the 1990s began, the first officially sanctioned public stock markets
in China since the Communist revolution were established in Shanghai and
Shenzhen. In 1992, these markets were opened to foreign investors with
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the first issuance of "B Shares", which are traded in U.S. dollars (in
Shanghai) or Hong Kong dollars (in Shenzhen).
The Chinese government has worked for the past several years to
formulate a comprehensive regulatory framework for the country's nascent
stock markets. In early 1993, the Securities Commission of the State
Council and its executive arm, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission ("CSRC"), were established by the State Council and charged
with regulatory authority over China's securities markets. In April 1993,
the State Council issued the Provisional Regulations on the Administration
of Share Issuance and Trading (the "Provisional Regulations"), which were
followed by the Detailed Implementing Rules for the Disclosure of
Information by Companies Limited by Shares Issuing Shares to the Public
(the "Disclosure Rules") and the Provisional Procedures on the Prohibition
of Securities Fraud (the "Fraud Procedures") later in 1993. In 1995 the
State Council issued the Provisions on the Listing of Foreign Investment
Shares [i.e., B Shares] Inside China by Companies Limited by Shares (the
"B Shares Provisions"), which were followed in 1996 by implementing
rules. A proposed national Securities Law has proceeded through
numerous drafts over the past three years and is eagerly awaited by the
investment community, but-in part because of the intense interest (and,
it appears, bureaucratic maneuvering) that the legislation has attracted
within the Chinese government-it has not yet been promulgated. In the
meantime, the NPC has promulgated a Company Law governing the
organization of joint stock companies, and the CSRC has issued
implementing rules under the Company Law relating to the issuance of
shares by Chinese enterprises in foreign markets (the "Overseas Listing
Rules") and a set of mandatory provisions for the articles of association of
such enterprises (the "Mandatory Provisions"). Various agencies have
issued regulations on such matters as state-owned assets, asset valuation,
accounting and auditing and labor matters, all of which have contributed
to the development of a regulatory framework for joint stock companies
and the stock markets.
The Provisional Regulations, which remain the principal source of
securities law in China pending completion of the national Securities Law,
reflect an effort to draw upon North American and European models to
create a modern system of securities regulation. Among other provisions,
the Provisional Regulations set forth approval requirements, general
disclosure requirements and procedures for listings of securities; require
periodic disclosure of information by issuers as well as prompt disclosure
of a number of specified "major events" relating to an issuer; require
disclosure of any holdings exceeding 5% of the outstanding shares; require
anyone acquiring at least 30% of the outstanding shares of an issuer to
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make an offer to acquire the remaining shares at a price equal to the
greater of the market price and the greatest price paid by the acquiror for
any shares within the past 12 months; and prohibit trading on inside
information (which is also dealt with extensively in the Fraud Procedures).
The Provisional Regulations relate to publicly traded stock in China,
including both B Shares and A Shares (shares traded in Renminbi and
permitted to be held by Chinese investors only). Offerings and trading of
securities of Chinese issuers on overseas markets (such as "H Shares"
traded on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and "N Shares" traded on the
New York Stock Exchange) are also governed by the securities laws and
listing rules applicable to the relevant trading market. The Overseas
Listing Rules and the Mandatory Provisions contain certain provisions
intended to facilitate compliance by Chinese issuers with foreign securities
laws and listing rules and to make Chinese issuers more attractive in
foreign markets.
The domestic market for bonds issued by Chinese enterprises is at an
earlier stage of development than the stock market. The bond market is
regulated principally by the People's Bank of China ("PBOC") rather than
the CSRC. Enterprise Bond Regulations were issued in 1993, but these
relate only to renminbi-denominated bonds issued in China by Chinese
enterprises. There is at present no public market in China for bonds
denominated in foreign currency.
Compared with the U.S. model, the Chinese securities regulatory
system as it now stands relies relatively more on administrative action and
relatively less on private action and market forces. With respect to the
issuance of securities, both domestically and abroad, it is a "merit-based"
system rather a "disclosure-based" system: an enterprise may issue stock
publicly only if it meets certain standards and receives the approval of the
CSRC. Enforcement of disclosure standards and other legal requirements
is principally through administrative action. Private rights of action under
the Provisional Regulations are unclear and are only beginning to be tested.
This is in sharp contrast to the U.S. system of "private enforcement,"
which provides a powerful mechanism for policing the securities markets
by facilitating direct recourse for investors against issuers in the courts.
Given the limited resources available to the CSRC and the length of time
required to build a strong securities regulatory institution with a critical
mass of competent and well-trained staff, the reliance on administratiye
enforcement is likely to be a drag on the development of the Chinese
securities markets for some time to come.
Another essential foundation of successful securities markets that will
take some time to develop in China is what might be called a "culture of
disclosure." The transition to public securities ownership, necessitating
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disclosure of previously confidential business information, is often
extremely jolting and traumatic for business people even in countries with
well-developed securities markets. The development of a habit of
disclosure-a reflexive response to business developments and decisions
in terms of their public disclosure implications-takes a long time in any
company. The impediments to this transition are all the more difficult in
China, where much business information is still classified as "state
secrets"-penalties for unauthorized disclosure being sometimes quite
severe-and where public securities ownership and the concept of
accountability to stockholders are very new phenomena. Disclosure in
China's securities markets is not yet up to international standards, and
compliance by Chinese issuers with disclosure rules applicable in foreign
markets requires a great deal of education, and especially careful due
diligence, by lawyers and bankers.
VII. COMPANY LAW AND JOINT VENTURE
LAW-RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND INVESTORS
When an investor purchases stock in a Chinese joint stock company,
he becomes a shareholder of that company, entitled to the rights of a
shareholder under the Company Law and the company's articles of
association. Likewise, when a foreign company invests in a joint venture,
it is entitled to certain rights under the applicable joint venture law and the
joint venture contract.
Under the Company Law, shareholders of a joint stock company have
certain enumerated rights and obligations. The shareholders' general
meeting is the primary means through which shareholders exercise their
powers under the Company Law. At the annual general meeting,
shareholders have the right to decide on the business policy and investment
plans of the company; to elect and replace directors and supervisors and
decide on matters concerning their remuneration; to consider and approve
reports of the board of directors and the supervisory board; to consider and
approve the company's proposed annual budgets, final accounts, profit
distribution plans and plans for making up losses; to pass resolutions
concerning the increase or reduction of the company's registered capital
and on the issue of company bonds; to pass resolutions on matters such as
the merger, division, dissolution or liquidation of the company; and to
amend the articles of association. All resolutions must be adopted by more
than half of the voting rights in attendance except for resolutions regarding
the merger, division or dissolution of the company and amendments to the
articles of association, which must be adopted by more than two-thirds of
the voting rights in attendance.
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Protection of minority shareholders of a corporation under Western
company laws is based in large part on the concept of "fiduciary duties"
of the directors of the corporation. In the U.S., these duties are expressed
in terms of a "duty of loyalty" (requiring directors to act in the interest of
all shareholders) and a "duty of care" (requiring directors to act with due
care in the management of the corporation's affairs), and there is an
extensive body of case law providing guidance as to what these duties
require in particular circumstances. The Company Law of the PRC
imposes a number of requirements on directors of companies governed by
that law, including a provision that directors "shall comply with the
Articles of Association of the company, perform their duties faithfully, and
uphold the interests of the company and shall not use their position in the
company to seek personal gain." The Overseas Listing Rules repeat this
dictate and provide further that the directors "shall act honestly and in good
faith and in the best interest of the company." What precisely the
formulation in the Overseas Listing Rules adds to the Company Law
provision, and whether they add up to a concept of fiduciary duty
comparable to that applicable in Western jurisdictions, will be difficul to
tell until a body of interpretation develops.
The Chinese law and regulations relating to Sino-foreign joint ventures
do not contain specific provisions regarding protection of minority
investors, other than provisions requiring certain major actions (including
amendment of the joint venture's articles of association, termination or
dissolution of the venture, change in the venture's registered capital and
merger of the venture with other organizations) to be approved by
unanimous vote of the directors. Parties typically include a broader list of
such matters in joint venture contracts. The joint venture law does not
include any provisions imposing fiduciary duties upon directors of joint
venture companies, and it is implied in law and commonly assumed in
practice that the principal role of a director in a joint venture company is
to represent the interests of the investor appointing that director.
V1in. ENFORCEMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
AND PROTECTION OF CREDITORS
A. Enforcement
As noted above, contracting parties are permitted under the FECL to
choose arbitration as the means for dispute settlement under the contract,
and contracts between Chinese and foreign enterprises typically provide for
arbitration. Foreigners tend to avoid the possibility of reference to the
People's Courts because of the risk of local bias and because of the other
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weaknesses of the Chinese judiciary discussed previously, and Chinese
parties also tend to prefer arbitration as the agreed means of dispute
resolution. Chinese law specifically prohibits reference of disputes relating
to joint venture and natural resources contracts to foreign courts, and only
arbitration and reference to the People's Courts are expressly authorized by
the FECL. In any event, China has not yet succeeded in concluding
judicial assistance agreements with most major Western nations for the
mutual recognition and enforcement of court judgments (France is a
distinguished exception), whereas it is a party to the New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
Accordingly, foreign parties tend to prefer submission to arbitration over
running the substantial risk that a foreign court judgment would not be
recognized by the Chinese courts. In cases (including many loan
agreements and derivatives transactions) when the contract is governed by
foreign law and the borrower has assets, or has granted sufficient security,
overseas, the foreign party may be comfortable that it will not need to
enforce a judgment in China and may therefore insist that the Chinese
party submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court for the resolution of
disputes.
Since the usual preference is for arbitration, the issue in negotiating
contractual dispute resolution provisions tends to be between Chinese
arbitration and arbitration outside China, with Chinese parties naturally
preferring the former and foreign parties the latter. The China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC") has exclusive
jurisdiction in China over foreign-related arbitration, except in maritime
cases. CIETAC's panel of arbitrators includes a number of foreign legal
experts, and CIETAC is developing a reputation as a reasonably fair and
efficient arbitral body. However, the operation of the CIETAC arbitration
rules makes it likely that the three-member arbitration tribunal in a given
case will consist of at least two Chinese arbitrators, raising concerns about
local bias. In addition, the CIETAC rules emphasize the role of mediation
in dispute resolution and encourage tribunals to act as both mediators and
arbitrators, which may make parties seeking the equivalent of a strict
judicial determination of their legal rights uncomfortable. Although it is
frequently a subject of intense negotiation, Chinese enterprises often agree
to arbitration outside China, with arbitration in Sweden under the auspices
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce being the most popular choice.
If an award is rendered by an arbitral tribunal in favor of a foreign
party and the Chinese party fails to honor it, or if the Chinese party
challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement itself, the foreign party
will have to seek enforcement of the agreement and/or the award in the
Chinese courts. Consistent with international practice and the New York
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Convention, the grounds on which an arbitration agreement or arbitral
award may be challenged in the Chinese courts are quite limited. A
potentially troublesome issue in this area is the possibility that a contract
(including the arbitration clause) might be challenged in court on the
ground that the Chinese party lacked legal person status or was acting
outside its authorized scope of business. Despite the principle of
"severability" of the arbitration clause reflected in Chinese arbitration law,
the law may be interpreted as requiring these issues to be determined by
the courts. In at least one case, Chinese courts have also refused to
enforce an arbitration clause on the ground that the dispute involved fraud
claims as well as contract claims and was therefore a matter for the courts.
Assuming that the arbitration agreement is valid, an arbitral award rendered
under it may only be challenged on the limited grounds set forth in the
New York Convention. In foreign-related cases (unlike in domestic
arbitrations) the courts are not permitted to review arbitral awards for
errors of law. At least in the case of a CIETAC arbitration, any challenges
to the validity of an arbitral award must be made in the Intermediate
People's Court in Beijing rather than in the Chinese party's local court
(presumably to minimize local bias in favor of the PRC party).
Chinese law includes provisions for execution and judicial levy against
the assets of an enterprise that fails to comply with a court judgment or
arbitral award, but as a practical matter any such action must usually be
taken in the courts of the locality where the Chinese party is based and
where it will have the maximum benefit of local connections and
favoritism. This has caused some problems for foreign parties in enforcing
arbitral awards in China, as Chinese courts have sometimes frustrated
foreign efforts to enforce both PRC and foreign arbitration awards. In an
effort to correct these problems, the Supreme People's Court in 1995 issued
a notice to lower courts requiring them to obtain the approval of High
People's Courts before invalidating an arbitration clause or declining to
enforce an arbitration award in cases involving foreign interests. In
general, there is still insufficient practical experience with the enforcement
of arbitral awards to permit a broad assessment of practice in this area to
be made with any confidence.
The discussion above summarizes the current state of law and practice
in typical situations where there is a direct contract between the foreign
party and the Chinese party. The situation with respect to securities issues
is somewhat different. In this area, distinctions should be drawn between
equity and debt securities; between securities offered on foreign markets




Purchasers of debt securities of Chinese issuers may have claims under
the terms of the securities themselves or under applicable securities laws.
"Window" entities issuing bonds abroad typically agree that foreign law
(for example, New York law in the case of dollar-denominated bonds
targeted principally at the U.S. market) will apply to claims in connection
with the bonds; will submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court and
appoint an agent for service of process in the relevant jurisdiction; and will
waive any claim of sovereign immunity in connection with any action
(including a proceeding to execute on assets to enforce a judgment) in
connection with the bonds. Prospectuses for such bond issues include a
disclaimer to the effect that the issuer has been advised by its Chinese
counsel that "there is doubt" as to the enforceability in Chinese courts of
claims relating to the bonds, whether in original actions or actions to
enforce judgments and whether arising under the terms of the bonds
themselves or under any foreign securities law. However, the "window"
enterprises typically have substantial assets abroad that creditors can look
to in evaluating their practical ability to enforce judgments. As the
universe of Chinese enterprises issuing debt securities abroad begins to
expand, the task of evaluating the credit quality of issuers in terms of
available security and other assets subject to levy abroad will become
increasingly complex.
The Chinese government, in issuing sovereign debt, takes a narrower
approach to submission to jurisdiction and waiver of sovereign immunity
than do the "window" entities. For example, in the 1994 U.S. dollar bond
issue, the government refused to submit to U.S. jurisdiction, or waive
sovereign immunity, in connection with any action under the U.S.
securities laws and refused to waive sovereign immunity in connection with
any action against its assets abroad to enforce a judgment relating to the
bonds. Clearly, the greater comfort of "full faith and credit" comes at a
price in terms of the availability of effective remedies in the event of a
default.
A purchaser of equity securities issued abroad by a Chinese enterprise
may have claims under applicable securities laws or claims under the
Company Law and/or the issuer's articles of association. A Chinese issuer
offering stock in a foreign market will submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the foreign country for claims under the applicable securities
laws, but will offer the usual disclaimers regarding the ability to enforce
foreign securities law liabilities in China. Pursuant to an agreement
between PRC and Hong Kong regulatory authorities, the Mandatory
Provisions require, in the case of H Share issuers, that claims under the
Company Law or the issuer's articles of association be submitted to
arbitration (with the claimant having the choice of either CIETAC
1997]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
arbitration or arbitration conducted by the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Center). Similar provisions have not to date been included in
the articles of association of N Share issuers; accordingly, holders of N
Shares would have to pursue such claims in the Chinese courts. China
lacks developed procedures analogous to two devices that are very
important under U.S. law in facilitating shareholder claims: the
shareholder derivative suit (pursuant to which shareholders may maintain
actions in the name of the corporation against corporate officers, directors
or controlling shareholders) and the class action suit (pursuant to which a
small number of shareholders may maintain an action on behalf of
themselves and all other shareholders similarly situated). Although some
suits similar to class actions are being experimented with, until such
devices are more than novelties, good claims may be legally or financially
infeasible for shareholders to pursue, thereby increasing reliance on
administrative authorities to enforce shareholder rights.
Purchasers of B Shares on the Chinese domestic market will generally
be relegated to the Chinese courts to pursue claims under the Chinese
securities laws, the Company Law or the issuer's articles of association.
Claimants will thus have to contend with the general weaknesses of the
Chinese court system discussed above as well as the barriers to bringing
shareholder derivative suits and class actions.
B. Mortgages and Security Interests
In 1995 China promulgated the long-awaited Security Law covering
security interests in real and personal property. The Security Law covers
five types of security: guaranties, mortgages (covering both movable and
immovable property), pledges (in which the possession of the security is
transferred), lien (in which the creditor under a service contract may retain
possession of the debtor's property as security for payment) and deposit.
Buildings, land use rights and movable property such as machinery may be
mortgaged. The mortgage provisions of the Security Law in particular
provide on a national scale what was previously available in many local
regulations: the mortgaging of land use rights and registration and
foreclosure provisions not substantially different from those common in
Western legal systems. Recent regulations have further elucidated the
means of properly registering a security interest in land use rights in
particular. Neither national nor local regulations, however, generally
contain provisions for the registration and enforcement of security interests
in personal property (i.e., tangible and intangible property other than real
property, such as equipment and intellectual property rights). While
Chinese law recognizes the grant of such a security interest as a contractual
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obligation, the lack of registration and foreclosure procedures means that
there is no effective protection against the claims of subsequent purchasers
without notice of the security interest, and no efficient means of executing
against the collateral in the event of a default on the underlying obligation.
There is very little practical experience in foreclosure on mortgaged
property in China. Any such foreclosure would require application to the
courts in the locality where the mortgaged property is situated, raising the
concerns discussed above regarding local favoritism. Even after the
promulgation of the Security Law, the state of law and practice relating to
mortgages and security interests in China has generally been viewed by
international financial institutions as an unacceptable basis for lending on
the strength of asset values. This is one reason why many institutions
refuse to lend to Chinese enterprises in the absence of a guarantee from the
Bank of China or other "window" entity. The sharp decline in the
availability of such guarantees, and the increasing need to develop viable
project finance structures for the development of China's infrastructure,
should provide a powerful stimulus for further development of the law in
this area. In the meantime, transactions must be structured creatively to
provide to the greatest extent possible for security located outside China.
C. Bankruptcy Law
There are several different pieces of legislation that deal with
bankruptcy in China. On the national level, there is the Law of the
People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (for Trial
Implementation) ("Trial Bankruptcy Law"), the Company Law (which
includes some bankruptcy-related provisions applicable to limited liability
companies and joint stock companies) and the Code of Civil Procedure
(which includes some bankruptcy-related provisions applicable to legal
persons, including joint ventures and other foreign-invested enterprises).
In addition, there are several local regulations relating to bankruptcy and/or
liquidation.
The Trial Bankruptcy Law was promulgated in 1986 and applies only
to state-owned enterprises, although it has been applied in practice by
courts to some collectively-owned enterprises. For practical and policy
reasons, bankruptcies have been allowed only on an experimental basis and
in relatively limited numbers since the law was adopted. All of the
national and local laws relating to bankruptcy require that a People's Court
declare an enterprise to be bankrupt for a bankruptcy to be effective,
regardless of whether the proceedings are voluntary or involuntary. The
Trial Bankruptcy Law also requires the consent of the department in charge
of the enterprise before the enterprise can even apply for bankruptcy.
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Creditors do receive some protections under the various bankruptcy-related
laws, including the ability to petition for the insolvency of a state-owned
enterprise; the creation of a liquidation committee by the People's Court;
the holding of creditors meetings at which all unsecured creditors have the
right to vote; a public announcement procedure for creditors to register
their claims; and the invalidation of certain actions taken by an enterprise
declared bankrupt before such declaration. In general, secured creditors
enjoy priority as to payment with respect to the collateral security. The
priority of payments to other claimants in the event of a liquidation is: (i)
expenses of the liquidation committee, (ii) accrued and unpaid salaries and
labor insurance, (iii) accrued and unpaid taxes and (iv) all other unsecured
claims and insufficiently secured claims (to the extent of the unsecured
amount).
The Trial Bankruptcy Law must be viewed as merely the first step in
a legislative process that may ultimately lead to a workable bankruptcy law
regime. As law and practice in this area now stand, it cannot be said that
there is a bankruptcy law in China that can be relied upon to protect
creditors from the dissipation of assets in an insolvency situation and to
provide an orderly framework for the reorganization or liquidation of
insolvent enterprises. The bankruptcy-related provisions of the Company
Law and the Code of Civil Procedure are not intended to substitute for a
comprehensive bankruptcy law regime. While the procedures applicable
under the Trial Bankruptcy Law once a bankruptcy proceeding is
commenced are reasonably consistent with international standards in terms
of protection of creditors, the law's limited scope, together with the judicial
and administrative discretion involved in the determination to commence
a bankruptcy proceeding and the lack of experience in administering
proceedings under the law, make it a very slender reed for the time being.
It is expected that a new bankruptcy law will be promulgated in the near
future. Chinese officials have promised that the new law will apply to all
types of enterprises and will allow less governmental interference in the
bankruptcy process.
IX. THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF HONG KONG
A. General Characteristics of Hong Kong Legal System
Hong Kong, which is a recognized international financial center, has
a well-developed and respected legal system based on the English common
law system. The principal sources of Hong Kong law are: (1) the rules of
common law and equity of England (so far as they are applicable to local
circumstances), (2) decisions of the Hong Kong courts, (3) local legislation,
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(4) English Acts and Orders in Council that apply to Hong Kong and (5)
Chinese law and custom.
Statutory law of Hong Kong is created by way of ordinance, and the
ordinances generally follow the principles of English Acts of Parliament.
Every ordinance in Hong Kong is a public ordinance. Ordinances are now
enacted bilingually with the first piece of bilingual legislation enacted on
April 13, 1989. The Chinese text is an authentic version of the law which
the courts can look to, with the English text, in ascertaining the meaning
of an ordinance.
When the English common law and the rules of equity are inapplicable
to the circumstances of Hong Kong or its inhabitants, Chinese law and
custom may be applied. There is even stronger reason to apply Chinese
law and custom where there is no local statute or decision covering the
particular circumstances. English law is not applicable when it would
result in "injustice or oppression," but it is not clear what this means in
practice.
The Hong Kong judiciary is generally considered to be well-qualified
and independent from the executive government. Currently, the highest
court in Hong Kong is the Court of Appeal. Below the Court of Appeal
is the High Court of Justice, which may be a trial court or an appeal court.
The High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal together constitute the
Supreme Court of Judicature. Below the High Court of Justice are the
District Courts and the Magistracies, which are inferior courts. Appeal
from the Court of Appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in England if certain conditions are met.
B. Key Provisions of Basic Law
In 1984, pursuant to a Joint Declaration with the PRC, the United
Kingdom agreed to surrender sovereignty over Hong Kong to the PRC in
1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong will become a special administrative
region ("SAR") directly under the authority of the central government of
China. The political slogan accompanying the 1984 treaty was "one
country, two systems": for 50 years after 1997, the Hong Kong SAR is to
have a high degree of autonomy; it will be largely self-governing, and, in
particular, the legal system and the laws will remain basically unchanged.
Hong Kong's new constitution will be the Basic Law (promulgated by the
PRC in 1990), which will take effect on the British departure in 1997. The
Basic Law will bind executive, legislative and judicial branches of the SAR
government and provide a framework in which the present legal system can
continue. The key provisions of the Basic Law as it relates to the Hong
Kong legal system and commercial law are as follows:
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* The Hong Kong SAR government will be composed of local
inhabitants. The Chief Executive, who will nominate principal
officials, will be appointed by Beijing after election or
consultations held locally.
" The legislature, to which the executive authorities will be
accountable, will be constituted by elections.
" Judicial power, which is to be exercised independently, will be
vested in the SAR courts, and these courts will possess the power
of final adjudication. Under the PRC's constitutional system,
however, the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power to
interpret the Constitution and the Basic Law and thereby to
determine questions that arise concerning the allocation of
competence between the SAR and the Central Government.
" A prosecuting authority will control criminal prosecutions free
from any interference.
" The laws previously in force, other than those made in the United
Kingdom, but including common law and equity, will be
maintained unless they contravene the Basic Law, subject to their
amendment by the SAR legislature.
" The rights and freedoms of inhabitants are to be protected. Every
person will have the right to judicial remedies, confidential legal
advice, access to the courts, and representation in the courts by
lawyers of his or her choice. Every person will have the right to
challenge the actions of the executive branch of government in
the courts.
" The social and economic systems in Hong Kong and the lifestyle
of inhabitants will remain unchanged.
The Basic Law also specifically stipulates that the Hong Kong SAR
government will provide an appropriate economic and legal environment
for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international
financial center. The degree to which the current legal system of Hong
Kong will remain relevant after the change to Chinese sovereignty,
however, cannot be confidently known, as it would be reckless to assume
that promises made in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law will all be
stringently observed. Much may depend upon how the NPC Standing
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Committee plays the role of "balance wheel" accorded to it, rather than to
the PRC Supreme Court, in what is a de facto experiment with a federal
system.
A 400-member selection committee of Hong Kong people is currently
being chosen for the purpose of electing the SAR's first Chief Executive.
The PRC is also preparing for a provisional legislature to replace Hong
Kong's present Legislative Council.
C. Issues Relating to the Judiciary Post-1997
As a practical matter, the prospects for preserving Hong Kong's legal
system-including its well-developed commercial law-after 1997 will
depend upon the continued strength, competence and independence of the
judiciary. For that reason, issues relating to the judiciary have taken on a
special significance in the run-up to 1997.
The Basic Law provides for the establishment of a Court of Final
Appeal in the Hong Kong SAR. Relying solely on the Basic Law, the
setting up of the court is possible only when the Basic Law comes into
effect on July 1, 1997. In 1991, however, the Chinese and the British
governments, through the Joint Liaison Group that is supposed to promote
a smooth transition, agreed in principle to the earlier establishment of the
Court of Final Appeal in order to achieve judicial continuity. Nevertheless,
after four frustrating years of failure, in June 1995 the two governments,
as part of a renegotiated understanding, abandoned the effort to establish
the Court of Final Appeal before the Basic Law comes into effect, but did
agree upon the principles for establishing the Court in 1997. This new
agreement, embodied in a draft of a Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
Bill, was adopted by Hong Kong's Legislative Council after prolonged and
bitter debate over its contents. One of the main controversies stirred by the
legislation dates back to the provisions of the 1991 UK-PRC agreement
concerning the composition of the court. Those provisions, reaffirmed in
the June 1995 renegotiated understanding, stipulate that, in any sitting, the
court is to consist of five judges: the Chief Justice, who by law must be
a Chinese national, three permanent Hong Kong judges (who may be local
or expatriate) and a non-permanent judge who may be drawn, depending
on the need of each particular case, from either a list of non-permanent
Hong Kong judges or a list of distinguished judges from other common
law jurisdictions. The provision regarding judges from other jurisdictions
originates from Article 82 of the Basic Law. The wording of that article
has given rise to heated debate as to whether at any one sitting more than
one overseas judge should be allowed. Many members of the legal
profession are of the opinion that the formula of at least four local judges,
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including the Chief Justice, and not more than one judge from overseas to
make up the court is not inconsistent with the Basic Law. Others,
including the Bar Association, disagree. There is also continuing
uncertainty and worry over the criteria and procedures for appointing the
Chief Justice and all other members of the Court of Final Appeal.
The other major controversy that has arisen concerns the court's
jurisdiction. Article 19 of the Basic Law removes "acts of state, such as
defense and foreign affairs" from the court's purview. Until announcement
of the June 1995 UK-PRC renegotiated understanding, this provision
attracted little attention, apparently because of the assumption that the
concept of "act of state" would continue to be interpreted narrowly as it
has traditionally been under English common law and would therefore not
remove many types of cases from the Court of Final Appeal's jurisdiction.
Opponents of the recent UK-PRC understanding claim that, as part of the
compromise reached, the UK agreed to accept the PRC's potentially much
broader definition of "act of state." The UK and the Hong Kong
Government deny this and emphasize that the task of reconciling the
common law and the Basic Law in this respect as in others will be left to
the courts. Yet, this further highlights the role to be played by the NPC
Standing Committee in interpreting the allocation of judicial power under
the Basic Law.
Of course, perceptions of the SAR legal system as a whole will also
reflect evaluation of the long-awaited detailed rules for appointing the
Chief Executive, electing the new legislature and for regulating their
relations with each other and with the Central Government, which is to
maintain an office in Hong Kong. Moreover, how the Communist Party
will relate to the new governmental arrangements will be a subject of
increasing attention.
X. CONCLUSION
This brief introduction gives some indication of the continued
weaknesses and gaps in the Chinese legal system, as well as of the major
strides that have been made over the past 18 years of rapid reform. The
Chinese legal system certainly remains underdeveloped in many important
areas. Law has played a leading role in the reform process, but in many
respects it is struggling to catch up with the enormous changes in the
economy and in business practice that reform has brought.
The question for investors is whether, despite the evident flaws of
Chinese law, a transaction in China can be structured in a manner that
limits legal risks to a manageable level. The experience of the last 18
years suggests that with prudence, discipline and a thorough understanding
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of where the pitfalls lie (and, it must be said, a healthy skepticism of short-
cuts through the legal thicket offered up by eager local parties promising
that their guanxi will save the day), foreign investors have a good chance
of avoiding disaster and earning returns proportionate to the risks they are
accepting.

